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Compared to the standard Phillips curve, an open-economy version that features a real exchange 
rate channel leads to a markedly different target rule in a New Keynesian optimizing framework. 
Under optimal policy from a timeless perspective (TP) the target rule involves additional history 
dependence  in  the  form  of  lagged  inflation.  The  target  rule  also  depends  on  more  parameters, 
notably the discount factor as well as two IS and two Phillips curve parameters. Stabilization policy 
in this open economy model is no longer isomorphic to policy in a closed economy. Because of the 
additional history dependence in an open economy target rule price level targeting is no longer 
consistent with optimal policy. The gains from commitment are smaller in economies where the real 
exchange rate channel exerts a direct effect on inflation in the Phillips curve. 
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For some time now central banks and academics have been preoccupied with the way 
monetary policy ought to be conducted in an era of relative price stability.  Woodford (1999a) 
proposes that the course of monetary policy in a forward-looking New Keynesian framework be set 
from a timeless perspective (commitment). This form of policy has a number of desirable features. 
To begin with, policy from a timeless perspective introduces history-dependence into the conduct of 
monetary policy because it is based on an optimal policy rule that depends on the change in the 
output gap. The policy instrument responds to a cost-push shock in the current and subsequent 
periods until the target variables return to their original targets. The gradual adjustment process gives 
rise to persistence in the behavior of the output gap and the rate of inflation. Because the conduct of 
policy is history-dependent under policy from a timeless perspective, this strategy dominates pure 
discretion under which the response of the target variables to the cost-push shock is confined to the 
current period. Moreover, since policy from a timeless perspective is a time-consistent form of 
optimal policy under commitment it serves as a standard of comparison for forms of discretionary 
policy that also inject an element of history-dependence into policymaking such as price-level 
targeting, a speed limit policy, nominal income growth targeting, average inflation targeting or 
money growth targeting. Jensen (2002), Néssen and  Vestin (2005), Soederstroem (2005), Vestin 
(2006), and Walsh (2003) evaluate the aforementioned discretionary strategies in a closed economy 
setting and verify to what extent these policies achieve the optimal stabilization results under policy 
from a timeless perspective. 
  
 This paper focuses on two key differences between policy in an open and a closed economy. 
First, it analyzes optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspective in a simple forward-looking 
framework to show that the open-economy target rule is far more complex than its closed-economy 
counterpart. Optimal stabilization policy in this open economy model is no longer isomorphic to 
policy in a closed economy. Second, the paper examines the connection between optimal policy and 
price level targeting and finds that the latter is not synonymous with the former in the proposed 
open economy model. Central to our discussion of policy in an open economy is a Phillips curve 
that features a real exchange rate channel. This exchange rate channel appears in the aggregate 
Phillips curve because domestic firms are concerned about their competitiveness at home and in 
world markets where their products compete with those produced by foreign firms. Briefly, an 
important objective of the typical cost-minimizing domestic firm is to avoid fluctuations in its firm-
specific terms of trade. Hence an incipient rise in the foreign price of the competing foreign good or   3   
a rise in the nominal exchange rate leads the typical domestic firm to raise the price of its output. 
Thus external factors induce a firm to alter the price of output, which it sets in domestic currency.  
Earlier contributions that examine the implications of the existence of an exchange rate channel 
for the conduct of monetary policy are Ball (1999), Walsh (1999), Svensson (2000), and Guender 
(2006). Ball motivates the real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve in a backward-looking 
framework by assuming that foreign producers are concerned only about receipts in their home 
currency. Any change in the nominal exchange rate is offset by adjusting the nominal price of the 
good in the foreign country. Positing a linear target rule, Ball finds that optimal policy requires a 
central bank to follow a monetary conditions index rather than a Taylor-type rule. Walsh (1999) 
derives an open-economy Phillips curve in a forward-looking model where the nominal wage 
demands are tied to the CPI. In a model that mixes elements of backward- and forward-looking 
behavior, Svensson (2000) introduces a Phillips curve where the expectation, formed in the past, of 
the change in the real exchange rate affects the current rate of inflation. He discusses a number of 
different policy strategies under discretion but does not derive the underlying endogenous target 
rules. Such an explicit target rule is derived in a forward-looking open economy model by Guender 
(2006) where firms are guided in their domestic pricing decisions by a benchmark price that is set in 
the world market. Such pricing behavior at the firm-level gives rise to an aggregate Phillips curve 
that depends on the real exchange rate and a target rule guiding optimal monetary policy that 
includes demand-side parameters. Guender considers only optimal policy under discretion.
 1        
Other contributions downplay or dismiss the importance of a real exchange rate channel in the 
Phillips curve. Drawing on empirical evidence that shows only weak correlations between changes 
in the nominal exchange rates and inflation rates for a number of countries, McCallum and Nelson 
(2000, p. 89) are sceptical about the existence of a direct exchange rate channel and its relevance in 
policymaking. Moreover, in their theoretical set-up of an open economy the effect of the real 
exchange rate on the output gap is neutralized as it affects both the level of actual output and the 
level of potential output in the same way. As a consequence, their Phillips curve is the same as in a 
closed economy. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001, 2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) derive 
essentially a closed-economy Phillips curve too except that the coefficient on marginal cost is 
sensitive to the degree of openness of the economy. These papers assume that firms that operate in 
small open economies set domestic prices without reference to world market prices or consideration 
of the effects of terms of trade changes on their competitiveness. 
                                                 
1 The design of optimal monetary policy is sensitive to the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Monacelli (2005) 
argues that incomplete exchange rate pass-through drives a wedge between policymaking in open versus closed 
economies.  He derives an open economy Phillips curve where the deviation of the world price from the domestic 
currency price of imports affects domestic and CPI inflation.    4   
 This paper takes a contrary view. It emphasizes that domestic firms value stability of their 
terms of trade in addition to stable prices. This concern forces cost-minimizing domestic firms to 
take account of expected changes in their firm-specific terms of trade when altering the domestic 
price of output. Changes in the nominal exchange rate and changes in the price charged by 
competing foreign firms are beyond the control of the typical domestic firm. Yet such changes 
affect its competitiveness. The only way that a domestic firm can counteract such pressure is to 
adjust its domestic price in such a way so that the overall cost to the firm is minimized.  If such 
pricing behavior applies to the typical firm, aggregation over all firms leads to a Phillips curve 
where the expected change in the real exchange rate impacts on domestic inflation.
2  
The implications for optimal monetary policy are stark. Once the existence of a real exchange 
rate channel in the Phillips curve is acknowledged, the optimal target rule under policy from a 
timeless perspective becomes vastly different from the standard target rule.
3 The new target rule 
depends on multiple parameters that appear in both the IS relation and the Phillips curve as well as 
on the discount factor. The proposed target rule is history-dependent too but differs from the 
standard target rule in a critical way: under policy from a timeless perspective the proposed target 
rule also features the lagged rate of inflation in addition to the lagged output gap. However, unlike 
the output gap, the rate of inflation does not enter the target rule in first-difference form. 
Optimal stabilization policy changes dramatically. In the absence of a real exchange rate 
channel in the Phillips curve it is optimal for the policymaker to fix the output gap as doing so 
ensures an optimal response to demand-side disturbances and leaves domestic inflation unaffected. 
If this channel does exist, however, the policymaker can no longer perfectly offset demand-side 
disturbances. Specifically, the policymaker‟s relative aversion to inflation variability shapes his 
response to demand-side disturbances. Both inflation and the output gap deviate from target. 
Further analysis shows that a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve matters greatly in 
other policy-related contexts. Comparing policy from a timeless perspective to discretion, we find 
that the gains from commitment are smaller in an open economy where a real exchange rate channel 
is operative in the Phillips curve. Under policy from a timeless perspective, an adverse cost-push 
shock prompts the policymaker to “lean with the wind”, i.e. lower the nominal interest rate if there 
is no exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve. If this channel exists, then the policymaker raises 
the interest rate. Such an ambiguous response cannot occur under discretion irrespective of whether 
a real exchange channel exists or not. 
                                                 
2 As in Ball (1999) and Svensson (2000), the derivation of the open-economy Phillips curve is laid out in the appendix. 
3 By standard target rule we mean the target rule that is associated with a standard Phillips curve where only the output 
gap exerts pressure on domestic inflation (abstracting from cost-push shocks and the expectation of future inflation).   5   
 The final noteworthy finding concerns price level targeting in an open economy framework. 
Woodford (1999a) and Vestin (2006) argue that in a simple closed economy forward-looking model 
price level targeting is consistent with optimal policy from a timeless perspective. This result does 
not carry over to the open economy framework proposed in this paper. There is a simple 
explanation for this result. Because of a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve the target 
rule under policy from a timeless perspective depends on the lagged rate of inflation. This has the 
effect of augmenting the history-dependence of optimal policy and rules out expressing the target 
rule governing price level targeting in such a way so as to be consistent with the target rule 
underpinning optimal policy from a timeless perspective. With the targeting rules being 
incongruous, the delegation of a price level target to a central banker with the requisite aversion to 
price level variability does not conform to optimal policy from a timeless perspective in an open 
economy even if the shocks follow a white noise process.  
The organization of the remaining parts of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
model. Section 3 analyzes the conduct of optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspective. 
Section 4 examines the case of pure discretion. Section 5 compares and contrasts the two forms of 
optimal policy. Section 6 takes up the discussion of the compatibility of price level targeting with 
optimal policy from a timeless perspective in an open economy framework. Section 7 offers a brief 
conclusion. 
 
2. The Model  
The model that will serve as the foundation for the analysis of the monetary policy issues 
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 t   the rate of domestic inflation   
 
CPI
1 t t E  the expected rate of CPI inflation 
 t q the real exchange rate
4  
t y = the output gap 
                                                 
4 The real exchange rate is defined as the difference between the domestic currency price of the foreign good and the 
price of the domestic good:  t
f
t t t p p s q    .  t s = the nominal exchange rate, expressed in terms of domestic currency 
per unit of foreign currency.  Thus the real exchange rate and the terms of trade are identical.   6   
 t R  the nominal rate of interest (policy instrument) 

f
t R the foreign nominal rate of interest 
 
f
1 t t E   the expected foreign rate of inflation 
f
t y = the foreign output gap 
Lower case variables represent logarithms. All parameters are positive. The discount factor   
is less than or equal to one. 
Equation (1) is the forward-looking open economy IS relation that features a real interest rate 
and real exchange rate channel. A foreign output shock and an idiosyncratic shock also affect the 
demand for domestic output.
5 Equation (2) represents the open-economy Phillips curve. The current 
rate of inflation moves not only in response to positive or negative realizations of the output gap but 
also in response to deviations of the current real exchange rate from its expectation next period. 
Equation (3) represents the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. Stochastic disturbances 
have been added to the three relations to reflect the existence of uncertainty in the economy.
6 More 
formally,  
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To simplify the analysis, we treat all foreign variables as exogenous random variables that are 
independent of each other.  
 
3.  Optimal Monetary Policy from a Timeless Perspective 
  The policymaker has a standard objective function consisting of squared deviations of the 
real output gap and the rate of inflation, respectively. The rate of inflation is defined in terms of 
changes in the level of domestic prices. The explicit objective function that he attempts to minimize 
is given by  
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  .             (5) 
All variables are as previously defined.  is the discount rate and   represents the relative weight 
the policymaker attaches to the squared deviations of the rate of domestic inflation from target. 
                                                 
5 The derivation of the forward-looking IS relation is explained in Guender (2006). A separate appendix, available from 
the author, shows how the shocks that appear in the IS relation can be motivated. 
6 The shock in the UIP condition can be thought of as a risk-premium. The property that all shocks are white noise 
follows Woodford (1999). Its purpose is to show that gradual adjustment of the output gap, the rate of inflation, etc. and 
the policy instrument is not exclusively tied to the presence of autocorrelated disturbances in the model.   7   
Equation (5) implies that the policymaker‟s sole concern rests with the output gap and domestic 
inflation. Fluctuations in the real exchange rate do not enter explicitly the loss function.
7,8 
To set the stage for illustrating how optimal policy in the open economy is carried out, it is 
helpful at the outset to reduce the dimension of the optimization problem to one involving only one 
constraint. A few simple steps need to be taken. First, substitute for the rate of CPI inflation in 
Equation (1).
9 Next, solve the UIP condition for the difference between the current and the expected 
real exchange rate and substitute this expression into both the IS equation and the Phillips curve 
relation. Then solve the IS relation for the expected real rate of interest ( 1   t t t E R  ). Following 
this, insert the expression for the expected real rate of interest into the Phillips curve relation. The 
following expression results: 
t t t t 1
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f f f f
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Equation (6) serves as the constraint that the policymaker faces in determining optimal policy. It is 
apparent that this constraint is different from the standard closed-economy Phillips curve. 
The optimization exercise thus reduces to the following: 
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Let the time period in which the policy problem is formulated be denoted by t=0. Then the 
Lagrangean can be written in the following form: 
                                                 
7 Adopting (5) as the welfare criterion ignores the effects on welfare of shifts in the real exchange rate on the level of 
potential output. Including only the output gap and the rate of domestic inflation in the loss function is rather typical in 
the literature and thus facilitates comparing the results of this article to earlier contributions (e.g. Aoki (2001), Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler (1999, 2001, 2002) or Svensson (2000)). Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2006) also include 
domestic inflation in the objective function, arguing that the production of output requires only domestic labor. For a 
contrasting view the reader is referred to Allsopp, Kara, and Nelson (2006) who argue that CPI inflation is the relevant 
inflation target variable if production is based on a foreign intermediate input.  
8 The target for the output gap and the rate of inflation is zero, respectively. 
9 Under perfect exchange rate pass-through 
CPI
t t 1 t t 1 t t 1 E E E q          where   denotes the weight on the price of the 
imported good in the CPI.   8   
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Taking the first-order conditions with respect to the two target variables in each time period yields 
the following set of equations: 
00
0




   

0 M
                  (9) 
1 0 1
1
2 y c ( c) 0
y
    

    

0 M




2 y c ( c) 0
y
     

    

0 M











                   (12) 
1 0 1
1
20   


   

0 M
                  (13) 
2 1 2
2
20   


   

0 M
                  (14) 
… 
… 
The remainder of this section draws attention to the importance of a real exchange rate channel in 
the Phillips curve and discusses its implication for optimal policymaking in an open economy 
framework. Part A takes up the case where the real exchange rate channel is suppressed while part 
B considers the case where the real exchange rate channel is operative. Part C analyzes the behavior 
of the endogenous variables of the model and the policy instrument with the help of impulse 
response functions. 
   9   
A. No Real Exchange Rate Channel in the Phillips Curve: b=0 
  Setting b=0 implies c=0. Closer inspection of equations (9)-(11) then reveals that the first-
order condition for the output gap in each period establishes the same systematic relationship 
between the output gap and the Lagrange multiplier: 
      tt 2y 0           t = 0, 1, 2, 3,…    (15) 
The invariant optimizing condition for the output gap is used below to substitute for the Lagrange 
multipliers to derive the optimal policy setting from a timeless perspective. Under this policy the 
policymaker ignores the start-up condition for the rate of inflation. Only the systematic relationship 
between the Lagrange multipliers and the rate of inflation from time t=1 onward is relevant:
10 
 
      t t 1 t 20              t = 1, 2, 3,…      (16) 
 
After using equation (15) to substitute for the Lagrange multipliers, one can express the target rule 
under optimal policy from the timeless perspective as: 
 







               (17) 
 
Thus in an open economy optimal policy from a timeless perspective is identical to optimal policy 
in a closed economy provided that there is no real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve. This 
result is consistent with the observation by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), according to whom the 
conduct of optimal policy in an open economy is isomorphic to policy in a closed economy.  
 
B. A Real Exchange Rate Channel in the Phillips Curve: b>0 
    With the direct exchange rate channel being operative, the structure of the first-order 
condition that applies to the output gap is no longer the same for all periods. More specifically, the 
condition in the initial period is different from the one that obtains in succeeding periods. In this 
respect the pattern followed by the output gap in the current context mirrors the pattern set by the 
                                                 
10 Equation (16) can also include the initial period, i.e. hold for t=0,1,2, 3…. In this case, to ensure dynamic 
consistency, the rate of inflation should be set in accordance with this optimizing condition in every period. But a 
special situation arises in the initial period. In period 0 the lagged Lagrange multiplier (λ-1) must equal zero. This 
effectively rules out the Phillips curve in the previous period (t=-1) serving as a constraint in the optimization exercise 
in period 0. Woodford (1999a,b), McCallum and Nelson (2004), Froyen and Guender (2007, Ch. 9) and Gali (2008, 
Ch.5) provide a detailed analysis of optimal policy from a timeless perspective in a closed economy framework.   10   
rate of inflation in the previous section. In the start-up period, the first-order condition that applies 
to the output gap is given by  
        00 2y ( c) 0                (18) 
 
while for period 1and subsequent periods the first-order condition is given by 
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Notice that the Lagrange multiplier of the initial period ( 0  ) appears in both first-order conditions. 
It appears in the first-order condition for the output gap in period 1 because the output gap in period 
1 appears as an element in the constraint that the policymaker faces in period 0. Thus forward-
looking behavior on the demand side of the economy is now instrumental in determining the 
optimizing condition that applies to the output gap.
11 
  The first-order conditions for the rate of inflation in the initial period and period 1 are 
unaffected by the existence of a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve:  
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Due to the existence of an exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve, optimal monetary from a 
timeless perspective cannot be conducted along the lines described in the previous section. The 
optimal behavior of the output gap in period 1 differs from that in the initial period. This being the 
case, the Lagrange multipliers  0  and 1  in equation (21) can no longer be substituted by drawing on 
the invariant initial optimizing condition for output for the initial period  and the subsequent period. 
  To design a time-consistent policy rule in an open-economy framework, the policymaker 
must disregard the optimizing condition for both target variables in the initial period, i.e. period 0. 
Thus, the policymaker must also ignore the initial optimizing condition for the output gap. The 
derivation of the target rule then requires the optimizing conditions from period 1 onward and 
proceeds as follows. Solve equation (14) for  2  , substitute the resulting expression into equation 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, the optimizing condition for the output gap can be expressed for all periods as  
                                     for t=0,1,2,3…. Again, to ensure dynamic consistency, the lagged Lagrange 
multiplier (   )  equals zero in the optimizing condition for the initial period. The constraint in period -1 has no bearing 
on the optimization problem in period 0. 
      11   
(11), and solve for  1  . Then substitute for  1   in equation (13) and solve for  0  . Next replace both 
Lagrange multipliers in equation (10) with the expressions for 0   and  1   to obtain the optimal target 
rule: 
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for all periods except the initial period.     
  Just like its counterpart in section 3, the target rule embodied by equation (23) is history-
dependent as it is based on the change in the output gap. Notice, however, that the weight on the 
change in the output gap is smaller in case the Phillips curve features a real exchange rate channel 
as c > 0. Moreover, there is an additional source of history dependence as the target rule for an open 
economy is based not only on the lagged output gap but also on lagged inflation.  Interestingly, it is 
not the change in inflation that matters in the open-economy target rule. The lagged rate of inflation 
bears a coefficient different from unity.  
  The presence of demand-side parameters in the target rule underscores the fact that the 
structure of the demand side of the economy plays a much more important role in the design of 
optimal monetary policy if a real exchange rate channel exists in the Phillips curve. Unlike the 
standard target rule (equation (17)), which depends only on  apart from the policymaker‟s 
preference parameter, the optimal policy rule for the open economy depends also on parameters that 
appear in the Phillips curve and in the IS relation. The interest and exchange rate (semi) elasticities 
1 a and  2 a  as well as b determine the coefficients on the change in the output gap and on the lagged 
rate of inflation. The discount factor also plays an explicit role in the determination of the target 
rule.  
  It is instructive to examine how the size of the parameters of the model affects the relative 
weight on the change in the output gap and on the lagged inflation rate, respectively, in the target 
rule. If both  and b are large relative to a1 and a2 then the rate of inflation responds sensitively to 
the output gap and the expected change in the real exchange rate while the output gap‟s response 
through the expected real interest rate and exchange rate channel, respectively is rather muted. As a 
consequence, the policymaker attaches a low relative weight to the change in the output gap when   12   
setting policy. Conversely, if a1 and a2 are large relative to  and b then the relative weight on the 
output gap in the target rule increases as the output gap reacts sensitively to the expected real 
interest rate and an expected change in the real exchange rate. In this event, only a small increase in 
the policy instrument is required to engineer a desired reduction in inflation through a contraction of 
real output. The relative weight on lagged inflation decreases as well given the increased emphasis 
on the output gap in setting policy. 




 measures the importance of lagged inflation in the target rule. 
Lagged inflation enters the target rule because of the existence of an exchange rate channel in the 
Phillips curve. The greater the sensitivity of the rate of inflation to expected changes in the real 
exchange rate in the Phillips curve, i.e. the greater the size of b for given values of  1 a ,  2 a  and  , 
the more important the lagged  rate of inflation becomes in setting policy today. Conversely, the 
greater the sensitivity of the rate of inflation to the output gap in the Phillips curve, i.e. the greater 
the size of  for given values of  1 a , 2 a , and b, the less significant the role of past inflation in the 
target rule.  
 
C. Why a Real Exchange Rate Channel in the Phillips Curve Matters  
 
  The importance of the real exchange rate channel for the behavior of the endogenous 
variables of the model is brought out in Figures 1 – 4.
12 These figures show how the output gap, 
domestic inflation, the real exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate respond to a cost-push 
shock, an IS shock, and a UIP shock.
13 The quantitative impact effect of these shocks on the four 
endogenous variables is also reported in Table 2. 
  Figure 1 depicts the response of the four variables to a positive cost-push shock when the 
real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve exists (b=0.05) while Figure 2 repeats the exercise 
for the case when the real exchange rate does not exist (b=0).
14 A comparison of the impulse 
response functions of the two figures reveals that  
                                                 
12 All four figures are based on 10   . Table 1 lists the values of the parameters upon which the impulse response 
analysis in this section is based. The table also lists the size of the variances of the shocks that figure in the comparisons 
of policy under discretion and from a timeless perspective carried out in the next section. 
13 The remaining shocks are only of minor interest as their effects are the same as or similar to a UIP or IS shock. For 
instance, a foreign interest rate shock causes the same effect on the variables of interest as a UIP shock while a shock to 
the foreign output gap behaves essentially like an IS shock.  
14 So as to not overstate the importance of the real exchange rate channel relative to the output gap in the Phillips curve  
b and  are of the same size. In their study of six countries Guender and  Yu (2007) find support for an exchange rate 
channel in the Phillips curve only for Korea.  The estimated size of b ranges from 0.04 to 0.1.   13   
  a positive cost-push shock has a much greater impact effect on the output gap, the real 
exchange rate and the policy instrument if a real exchange rate channel exists in the Phillips 
curve (b>0).  
  a positive cost-push shock has a somewhat greater impact effect on the rate of inflation if a 
real exchange rate channel does not exist in the Phillips curve (b=0).  
  policy tightens in response to a positive cost-push shock if b > 0 according to Figure 1. 
Notice the stark difference in Figure 2: choosing the optimal response to a cost-push shock, 
the policymaker lowers the nominal interest rate if no real exchange rate channel exists in 
the Phillips curve.  
The intriguing behavior of the nominal interest rate can be traced to the UIP condition. The positive 
cost- push shock causes the real exchange rate to fall, i.e. the right-hand side of the UIP condition 
increases. At the same time, the positive cost-push shock lowers expected inflation next period 
because of the decrease in the current output gap, thus also increasing the left-hand side of the UIP 
condition.
15 However, the reduction in the current output gap is sufficiently large to require a fall in 
the nominal interest rate so that the UIP condition is restored in the aftermath of the cost-push 
shock.
16   
  Figure 3 shows that a domestic demand-side disturbance causes the rate of inflation and the 
output gap to deviate from their respective target value. The top two panels illustrate how the rate of 
inflation falls and the output gap rises in response to a positive IS shock for the case b=0.05. 
According to the top panel of Table 2, these impact effects on inflation and the output gap are 
quantitatively small, at -0.0574 and 0.0728, respectively. Nevertheless, they underscore the fact that 
the policymaker is unable to prevent a one-time demand-side disturbance from affecting both target 
variables temporarily. The responses of the policy instrument and the real exchange rate, which are 
shown in the bottom panels, help explain why this is the case. In his effort to provide the optimal 
stabilization response, the policymaker raises the nominal interest rate. The positive change in the 
setting of the policy instrument causes the real value of the domestic currency to appreciate which 
                                                 
15 As shocks are white noise, expected inflation next period is given by: 
t t 1 20 t E c y 
  with 
20 c0   
16 Inspection of the reduced form equation for the output gap and the reaction function of the policymaker yields the 
same insight. For b=0, 10     and values for the other parameters in accordance with Table 1, the two equations are: 
t t 1 t
t t t 1 t
y 0.853893y 0.426946u






Substituting the former into the latter results in a negative coefficient on the cost-push shock. The nominal interest rate 
decreases in the wake of a positive cost-push shock.    14   
lowers domestic inflation through the Phillips curve.
17 As inflation changes, the output gap must 
adjust to be consistent with the target rule.   
  A closer look at the target rule also explains why the behavior of the two target variables is 
clearly different if the real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve does not exist. If b0  , the 
target rule is the same as in the standard closed economy model where demand-side disturbances do 
not affect the target variables because the policymaker simply adjusts the interest rate to offset the 
effect of the demand-side disturbance on the output gap. This keeps the output gap fixed at its target 
level. Because the output gap does not change and because of the absence of a direct exchange rate 
channel there is no spillover effect onto the Phillips curve. Thus domestic inflation does not deviate 
from its target level.
  The isomorphic character of optimal policy holds. 
   Figure 4 traces the effects of UIP shocks on the four variables. The reaction of the output 
gap, inflation, and the real exchange rate to a positive UIP shock is very similar to that of a positive 
IS disturbance, albeit in the opposite direction. In general, the closer a1 is to one, the more the shape 
of the impulse response functions for an IS disturbance resemble those of a UIP disturbance. 
 
4. Optimal Policy under Pure Discretion 
  Under pure discretion, the policymaker sets policy anew in every period. In carrying out the 
minimization exercise at the beginning of a given period, the policymaker treats the expectations of 
the endogenous variables that appear in the constraint as constants. Because the policymaker re-
optimizes every period, the start-up optimizing conditions of the target variables form the basis for 
the optimal target rule under discretion. These optimizing conditions are given by equations (9) and 
(12): 
00 2y ( c) 0         (9)        00 20       (12) 











More generally,  
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Thus the optimal target rule under pure discretion does not introduce history dependence into the 
conduct monetary policy.
18 Compared to a closed economy framework, the weight on the output 
                                                 
17 Strictly speaking, the increase in the nominal rate of interest leads to, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the difference 
between the real exchange rate and the expected real exchange rate next period.    15   
gap is smaller in an open economy provided that there is a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips 
curve, i.e. c > 0. 
 
5. An Evaluation of the Two Policy Regimes 
  In this section we compare and contrast the performance of optimal policy from a timeless 
perspective relative to pure discretion in an open economy. To underscore the importance of a real 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve for policymaking, we again distinguish between two 
cases: b=0.05 and b=0. In addition, we employ two different values of the policymaker‟s relative 
aversion to inflation variability:  1   and  10   . 
  Table 2 reports the coefficients on the three disturbances in the reduced form equations for 
the rate of inflation, the output gap, the real exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate. The 
coefficients in the top panel capture the contemporaneous response of the four variables to an IS 
shock, a cost-push shock, and a UIP shock for the case where a real exchange rate channel is 
operative in the Phillips curve: b=0.05. Inspection of these coefficients yields a few noteworthy 
insights.  
  The impact effects of all three disturbances on the two target variables t y  and  t  are smaller 
under policy from a timeless perspective than under discretion. This is a direct consequence 
of the fact that commitment requires that the two target variables return gradually to their 
target levels in the wake of a shock while discretion requires adjustment of the variables to a 
shock within the period.  
  The impact effect (in absolute terms) of a cost-push disturbance on all four variables is 
smaller under policy from a timeless perspective than discretion.  
  The picture is less clear for IS and UIP shocks. Suffice it to say that both shocks evoke 
similar responses of the nominal rate of interest and the real exchange rate under both policy 
strategies.  
  The lower panel reports results for the case where a real exchange rate channel in the 
Phillips curve does not exist (b=0).   
  Here policy type matters for the reaction of the policy instrument in the face of a cost-push 
shock as explained in the previous section.  
  In the absence of a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve, IS and UIP shocks have 
no effect on the target variables under both forms of policy.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
18 Examining the impulse response functions under discretion is not as revealing as under policy from a timeless 
perspective. Because of the absence of history dependence under discretion, the effect of the shock is felt only in the 
current period.    16   
  Both policy from a timeless perspective and discretion lead to the same contemporaneous 
response of the real exchange rate and the nominal rate of interest, respectively, to IS and 
UIP disturbances. This happens because the responses of both variables are independent of 
policy design and thus purely mechanical.
19  
 
Table 3 summarizes the overall performance of the two policy strategies and reports the 
variances of the three endogenous variables and the policy instrument for  1   and 10   . The top 
panel considers the case where a real exchange rate channel is operative in the Phillips curve while 
the bottom panel considers the case where it is absent. The dominance of policy under a timeless 
perspective over discretion is evident. In all four cases expected losses under policy from a timeless 
perspective are lower than under discretion. The gain from commitment relative to discretion does 
vary, however, depending on whether a real exchange rate channel exists in the Phillips curve. 
Substantial gains are realized in case the Phillips curve is the standard closed-economy variant. 
Specifically, the percentage gain from commitment rises from 4.63 % to 12.47 % as the relative 
weight on the variance of inflation in the expected loss function rises from  1    to  10.    The 
gain from commitment is more modest for an open-economy Phillips curve (b>0):  as   increases 
from 1 to 10 the percentage gain from being able to precommit rises from 4.25 % to 9.02 %.  
Overall, the policymaker wields better control over the variability of the rate of inflation if a 
real exchange rate channel is operative in the Phillips curve. This comes at some cost though as the 
variability of the output gap increases if b>0. 
 
6. Is Price Level Targeting Consistent with Optimal Monetary Policy from a Timeless 
Perspective in an Open Economy? 
 
  The presence of a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve has further implications 
for policymaking in an open economy. This section shows why the delegation mechanism fails in 
the open economy model proposed in this paper.  
Woodford (1999a) argues that price level targeting is consistent with optimal policy from a 
timeless perspective in the forward-looking model of a closed economy. This is a direct 
consequence of the fact that price level targeting produces the same optimal response to 
                                                 
19 It is also worth pointing out that under discretion, the coefficient on the UIP shock in the reduced form equation for 
the real exchange equals one minus the coefficient on the UIP shock in the equation for the nominal interest rate. This 
result holds also under policy from a timeless perspective provided the real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve 
is not operative. The real exchange rate and the nominal rate of interest respond alike to an IS shock albeit in opposite 
directions under discretion. This result also holds under commitment if b=0.   17   
disturbances as policy from a timeless perspective. The literature on the delegation issue in the 
conduct of monetary policy has recognized the attractiveness of price level targeting in the forward-
looking model.
20 That price level targeting under discretion is compatible with optimal monetary 
policy from a timeless perspective can be seen by comparing the target rules that underlie both 
strategies of monetary policy.  
In the standard New Keynesian framework, the target rule under optimal policy from a 
timeless perspective relates the rate of inflation to the change in the output gap: 
        t t 1 t
1
( y y ) 0 

               (25) 
This target rule can be rewritten in terms of the output gap and the price level:
21 
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The target rule under discretionary price-level targeting is given by:
22 
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The parameter  ˆ  denotes the weight the policymaker assigns to the squared deviations of the price 
level from its target value in the intertemporal loss function. After replacing the expectation of the 
output gap with  12 t p  and some algebraic manipulation, we can restate equation (27) as:
23 
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Comparing (26) with (28), we find that the two target rules differ only to the extent of the relative 
weight on the output gap. This in turn implies that in a closed-economy framework a suitably 
chosen central banker who engages in discretionary price level targeting can replicate the behavior 
of the rate of inflation and the output gap that occurs under optimal policy from a timeless 
perspective.  
                                                 
20 See Vestin (2006) for an analysis of price level targeting and the delegation issue in the context of a closed economy.  
21 In what follows we assume that the target for the price level (p
*) is zero. 
22 The derivation of the target rule under price level targeting is laid out in Appendix C. 
23  12  = the coefficient on the lagged price level in the putative solution for the current price level.  22  = the coefficient 
on the lagged price level in the putative solution for the current output gap.   18   
  To examine whether society can achieve the same outcome in the open-economy framework 
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If we can show that the target rule under discretionary price level targeting is compatible with 
equation (23), then the delegation of monetary policy to a suitably chosen central banker also works 
to society‟s benefit in an open economy framework. The target rule that applies to discretionary 
price level targeting in an open economy is given by: 












        (29) 
 
Inspection of (23) and (29) reveals that the two target rules are incongruous. That is to say that the 
target rule under optimal policy from a timeless perspective cannot be manipulated so as to be 
expressed solely in terms of the output gap and the price level, the two variables that appear in the 
target rule under discretionary price level targeting.
 The direct implication of this result is that 
discretionary price level targeting in an open economy cannot replicate the behavior of the rate of 
inflation and the output gap that eventuates under optimal policy from a timeless perspective. The 
delegation of a price level target to a central banker, who acts with discretion, does not achieve the 
gains that accrue from commitment in an open economy.  
  The breakdown of the delegation process in an open economy is due to the lack of history 
dependence of policy under price level targeting.  At the very least, policy would have to respond to 
the lag of the price level to make the target rule under discretionary price level targeting compatible 
with the target rule under optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
24 Stated differently, optimal 
policy from a timeless perspective makes the conduct of monetary policy depend on the lagged 
output gap and the lagged rate of inflation. Thus there are two sources that account for the history 
dependence and produce the optimal degree of inertia in the conduct of optimal policy under 
commitment. 
  Further inspection of the target rules under optimal policy from a timeless perspective and 
discretionary price level targeting shows that the breakdown of the delegation process in an open 
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economy framework is due to the existence of an exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve. 
Setting b=0 yields c=0. Most important, the lagged rate of inflation drops out of the target rule 
under optimal policy from a timeless perspective. This in turn restores the compatibility of 
discretionary price level targeting with optimal policy from a timeless perspective. 
   
7. Conclusion 
  This paper has examined the design of optimal monetary policy in an open economy version 
of the forward-looking model.  Its major finding is that the existence of a real exchange rate channel 
in the Phillips curve changes the design of optimal policy in no small measure. First and foremost, 
the target rule under policy from a timeless perspective becomes more complex. The lags of both 
target variables appear in it, thus making the conduct of policy more history-dependent. The 
discount factor as well as IS and Phillips curve parameters determine the weights attached to the 
change in the output gap and the lagged rate of inflation.  
  With the target rule being significantly different if a real exchange rate channel is operative 
in the Phillips curve, it is not surprising that the character of stabilization policy changes. The 
policymaker can no longer perfectly stabilize both the domestic rate of inflation and the output gap 
in the wake of IS or UIP disturbances by mechanically adjusting the policy instrument. Demand-
side disturbances thus cause temporary effects on both variables. Optimal stabilization policy in 
such an open economy is no longer isomorphic to policy in a closed economy.  
  Whether or not a real exchange rate channel exists in the Phillips curve also matters for the 
delegation issue. Discretionary price level targeting is consistent with optimal policy from a 
timeless perspective in a closed economy because the target rules that govern both strategies are 
compatible in the sense that they can be expressed in terms of the same target variables. This result 
does not carry over to the open economy framework of this paper because the timeless perspective 
introduces additional history dependence through inflation into the conduct of monetary policy. 
This additional history dependence cannot be matched by price level targeting. 
  The paper also assesses the welfare gains under commitment relative to discretion. The 
results suggest that the welfare gains under policy from a timeless perspective are somewhat lower 
in an open economy framework where a real exchange rate channel exists in the Phillips curve. 
  Taken altogether, the findings reported in this paper warrant the conclusion that optimal 
policy in an open economy framework is substantially different from optimal policy in a closed 
economy. The mere existence of a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve suffices for the 
conduct of optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspective to be more complex and 
information-intensive. The realistic assumption that in a small open economy individual firms take   20   
account of fluctuations in the terms of trade when adjusting prices provides a conduit through which 
the real exchange rate enters the aggregate Phillips curve. Its presence there ensures a prominent 
role for the real exchange rate in the design of optimal monetary policy.  21   
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Appendix A:  Derivation of the Open Economy Phillips Curve.
  
The starting point is Rotemberg (1982). Monopolistically competitive firms aim to minimize 
menu costs weighed against the cost of being away from the optimal price they would charge in the 
absence of those menu costs.  This optimal price is denoted
OPT p .  In addition, being concerned 
about changes in their competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign firms, domestic firms wish to avoid 
changes in their terms of trade by engaging in terms-of-trade smoothing. Unstable terms of trade 
interfere with the domestic firms‟ competitiveness in the domestic market as well as world markets. 
Such fluctuations tend to unhinge the steady market share of firms. Specifically, at time t domestic 
firms attempt to minimize the squared difference between the current and next period‟s terms of 
trade.
25 The objective function faced by the typical firm j is: 
   
t
2 2 i OPT 2
t t t i t i t i t i 1 t 1 i t i p( j )
i0
min ( j) E p( j) p( j) c p( j) p( j) d(q( j) q( j) ) 

       

              (A1) 
where:
1 
t ( j)   = the total cost of firm j at time t 
t p( j)  = the price of the good produced by firm j at time t 
OPT
t p( j)  = the optimal price firm j charges 
f
t t t t q( j) p s p( j)     = firm-specific terms of trade  
      = the constant discount factor 
  c   = the parameter that measures the costs of changing prices relative to the costs of 
deviating from the optimal price 
  d    = the parameter that measures the costs of changes in the firm‟s terms of trade relative 
to the costs of deviating from the optimal price 
  t E   = the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t.     
  After taking and rearranging the first-order condition for the above cost-minimization 
problem, we can characterize the relationship between past, current, and future price levels as well 
as the current and expected terms of trade as: 
   
OPT
t t 1 t t 1 t t t t t 1 t
1d
p ( j) p( j) E p( j) p( j) p( j) p( j) (E q( j) q( j) )
cc
                   (A2) 
                                                 
25 Alternatively, the firm could be concerned about minimizing the deviation between 
ti q
 and 
t i 1 q
 in which case the 
first-order condition would contain the change in the current firm-specific terms of trade next to the change in the 
expected terms of trade. The resulting Phillips curve would then also feature the change in the real exchange rate (
t q 
t1 q
 ).  Including    , while defensible, complicates the analysis considerably as it rules out the derivation of an 
analytical target rule that lends itself to straightforward interpretation. For this reason, this case is not pursued here.   25   
Here we see that the expected change in the firm-specific terms of trade matters in the pricing 
decision. The greater the relative weight of expected changes in the terms of trade in the total cost 
function  compared to the relative weight on costly price changes, the more the expected change in 
the terms of trade factors in the decision to change the price of output in the current period. Changes 
in the current nominal exchange rate and changes in the price charged by competing foreign firms 
are beyond the control of the typical domestic firm – they are exogenous. Yet such changes affect 
its terms of trade, i.e. its competitiveness. The only way that a domestic firm can counteract such 
pressure is to adjust its domestic price in such a way so that overall costs are minimized.  
Next, consider the formation of the firm‟s optimal price: 
 
OPT
t t t t ˆ p( j) p y( j) ( j)                                        0                                            (A3)      
 
where all variables are as previously defined. In addition: 
t p ˆ  = the price charged by competing firms at time t 
t y( j) = output produced (relative to potential) by firm j 
t ( j)   = a stochastic disturbance.  
  Under imperfect competition, a firm sets its optimal price as a mark-up over marginal cost. 
But marginal cost and real output are positively related.
26 Hence it is innocuous to replace marginal 
cost with the output gap in (A3).
 To capture the idea of a time-varying mark-up factor, we treat it as 
a random element that enters into the process of setting the optimal price. Hence  t   appears in 
equation (A3).
27   
  The other important factor that influences the firm‟s optimal price is the benchmark price set 
by competing firms. This price, denoted by, t ˆ p  equals the aggregate domestic price level t p .  
  Substituting equation (A3) into (A2) and aggregating over all firms yields equation (A4), an 
open-economy Phillips curve:  
      t t t 1 t t t t 1 t E y b(q Eq ) u                              (A4)                                         
where 
                                                 
26 Within a general equilibrium framework, the co-movement between marginal cost and economic activity can be 
established by combining the labor supply and demand relations with the market clearing condition in the goods market. 
On this point see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001, 2002) or Gali and Monacelli (2005) who derive a similar relation that 
stresses the positive relation between real marginal cost and domestic consumption. The positive link between output 
and marginal cost is also characteristic of earlier models of monopolistic competition such as Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987). The link features also prominently in Mankiw and Reis (2002) who propose an alternative Phillips curve that is 
based on slow dissemination of information.  
27 For an investigation of the time-varying mark-up factor, see Ball and Romer (2003).   26   
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Appendix B:   
 
The solutions for the endogenous variables and the policy instrument of the model under policy 
from a timeless perspective are: 
 
Output Gap: 
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Real Exchange Rate: 
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Nominal Interest Rate: 
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Appendix C: 
  Under discretionary price-level targeting, the policymaker minimizes the current and 
expected future deviations of the price level and the output gap from its respective target value. The 
minimization exercise is repeated every period and the process of expectations formation is taken as 
given. The constraint for the policy problem is obtained by combining the UIP condition and the IS 
relation with the Phillips curve.  
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(C1) 
  ˆ  = policymaker‟s aversion to price level variability. 
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to the choice variables  t y and t p yields: 
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      (C3) 
Notice that the conditional expectations of the price level and the output gap in period t+1 have 
been replaced with the conditional expectation of the respective putative solution. The 
undetermined coefficients  12  and  22  appear in the putative solution for the output gap and the 
price level, respectively: 
    11 12 1 13 14 15 16 17
f f f
t t t t t t t t y u p v R y                         (C4) 
    21 22 1 23 24 25 26 27
f f f
t t t t t t t t p u p v R y                        (C5) 
Combining the first-order conditions (and setting
* p0  ) results in the target rule that 
systematically relates the price level to the current and the expected output gap in period t+1. 
   
t 22 12 t t 1
t
y ( (1 ) c 1) E y
p0
ˆˆ ( c) ( c)
   
   
   
  

         (C6) 
 
Letting  1 12 t t t E y p    and rearranging the above equation yields the target rule under price level 
targeting in the text (Equation (29)). Equation (27) obtains ifc0  , i.e. if the real exchange rate 
channel in the Phillips curve does not exist. 
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Figure 2: 
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Figure 3: 
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Figure 4: 
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Table 1: The Parameters of the Model 
      f   
f       f    a1  a2  a3     b    
5/7  1  2  0.15  0.3  0.9  0.5  0.3  0.27  0.05  (0,0.05)  (1,10) 
 
The variances of all random disturbances are fixed at 0.9 
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Table 2: The Impact Effect of the Disturbances on the Variables of the Model 
 
                                       Timeless Perspective 
                                     
                                            Discretion 
                                                                                                10; b 0.05                                                                                        
           
t    t y   t q   t R   t    t y   t q   t R  
           t u   0.7835  -0.9944  -1.5299  1.0317  0.8612  -1.0931  -1.6817  1.6817 
           t v   -0.0602  0.0764  -1.4207  1.4591  -0.0662  0.0840  -1.4091  1.4091 
          t    0.0301  -0.0382  0.7103  0.2704  0.0331  -0.0420  0.7045  0.2955 
                                                                                                1; b 0.05                                                                                       
           
t    t y   t q   t R   t    t y   t q   t R  
           t u   0.9422  -0.1195  -0.1839  0.0747  0.9841  -0.1249  -0.1921  0.1921 
           t v   -0.0724  0.0091  -1.5243  1.5327  -0.0757  0.0096  -1.5236  1.5236 
          t    0.0362  -0.0045  0.7621  0.2336  0.0378  -0.0048  0.7618  0.2382 
                                       Timeless Perspective 
                                     
                                            Discretion 
                                                                                                10; b 0                                                                                        
           
t    t y   t q   t R   t    t y   t q   t R  
           t u   0.8538  -0.4269  -0.6568  -0.0287  0.9756  -0.4878  -0.7504  0.7504 
           t v           0       0  -1.5384  1.5384          0       0  -1.5384  1.5384 
          t            0       0  0.7692  0.2308          0       0  0.7692  0.2308 
                                                                                                1; b 0                                                                                        
           
t    t y   t q   t R   t    t y   t q   t R  
           t u   0.9512  -0.0475  -0.0731  -0.0428  0.9975  -0.0498  -0.0767  0.0767 
           t v           0       0  -1.5384  1.5384          0       0  -1.5384  1.5384 
          t            0       0  0.7692  0.2308          0       0  0.7692  0.2308 
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Table 3: Summary Measures of the Performance of Commitment and Discretion 
  
  b=0.05                                   Timeless Perspective                                                                                                                Discretion 
                                                                                                   10                       
t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R )  t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R ) 
0.5985  1.1188  4.9035  2.9454  0.6725  1.0834  4.7791  4.4109 
                                                                                          
                                                                                 % Gain from Commitment: 9.02 
                                                                                                   1                       
t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R )  t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R ) 
0.8250  0.0293  2.6830  2.1840  0.8781  0.0141  2.6450  2.1737 
                                                                                     
                                                                                % Gain from Commitment: 4.25 
b=0                                    Timeless Perspective                                                                                                                Discretion 
                                                                                                   10                       
t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R )  t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R ) 
0.7079  0.6056  4.0962  2.1808  0.8566    0.2141    3.1696    2.6849 
                                                                                         
                                                                                 % Gain from Commitment: 12.47 
                                                                                                   1                       
t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R )  t V( )         t V( y )        t V(q )       t V(R ) 
0.8347  0.02139  2.7133  2.1954  0.8955  0.0022  2.6680  2.1834 
                                                                                      
                                                                                % Gain from Commitment: 4.63   
Notes:  Expected Loss = 
S S S










1.  The above loss function obtains after premultiplying the intertemporal loss function by  (1 )    and letting  1.    
2.  Only the variances of the cost-push shock, IS shock, and the UIP shock enter into the calculation of the variances of inflation, the output gap, the real exchange rate, 
and the policy instrument. 
 